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Abstract
We examine optimal price ceilings when the regulator is uncertain about demand and maximizes
expected consumer surplus. With perfect competition, if regulatory uncertainty is large enough,
then softer intervention is called for, with the price ceiling set at a relatively high level compared
with a full information scenario. In an imperfectly competitive setting where symmetric firms
compete in supply functions, with large enough uncertainty, the optimal ceiling increases with
the degree of competition, so greater competitive pressure justifies less restrictive regulation.
Under perfect competition, we also determine a cut-off level of rationing efficiency below which
a price ceiling should not be used.
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I. Introduction
Although controversial, price ceilings have been used in a wide range
of markets, including those for rental accommodation, gas, electricity,
telecommunications, pay-day lending, and basic consumption goods. One
rationale for price ceiling regulation is to correct inefficiency stemming
from insufficient competition, while another is the protection of consumers.
The latter rationale can explain the use of price controls in nearly
competitive markets, including those for rental accommodation in developed
economies (see Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003, on US rent controls) and those
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for basic food products in developing economies (see Mbaye et al., 2015,
on price caps in Senegal).1
Price ceilings have been used extensively in utility markets, where
competition is typically restricted, to secure low prices for consumers.
Sappington and Weisman (2010) discuss the use of price ceilings in
telecommunications, while Davis and Kilian (2011) examine price caps
empirically in the US residential market for natural gas. A survey of
regulators in transition and developing economies by Kirkpatrick et al.
(2005) found that price controls had been used in 40 percent of the
countries, most commonly in telecommunications (76 percent).
To correct market inefficiency, price regulation would aim to maximize
total welfare. However, in recent years, there has been an increase in the
focus of policy-makers and regulators on consumer welfare and a greater
involvement of consumer groups in policy debate.2 Following the 2002
Enterprise Act, approved UK bodies were designated super-complainants
at the Office of Fair Trading to “strengthen the voice of consumers”
and to protect their interests.3 Moreover, in markets where the suppliers
are foreign-owned, consumer surplus might be an appropriate measure of
domestic welfare. So the realities of regulation are more complex and call
for a better understanding of a consumer-surplus standard in economic
analysis.
In this paper, we explore how market conditions affect the level of
a price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus in a setting
where the regulator is uncertain about demand. Our framework allows for
varying degrees of competition, so it fits a gamut of market structures. We
investigate first the impact of regulatory uncertainty on the optimal ceiling
for perfect competition, and then the relationship between competitive
pressure and the optimal level of intervention. We also examine the effect
of arbitrary levels of rationing inefficiency on the optimal ceiling.
1Other developing economies with price caps include Kenya and Argentina. See the Reuters
articles “Kenya Enacts Price Control Law” of 16 September 2011 (https://www.reuters.com/
article/ozabs-kenya-prices-idAFJOE78F0FM20110916) and “Argentine Peso Hits New Lows
as Food Price Controls Take Effect” of 7 January 2014 (https://uk.reuters.com/article/economy-
argentina-peso/-peso-hits-new-argentine-lows-as-food-price-controls-take-effect-idUKL2N0K
H16320140107).
2Empirical evidence suggests that lobby groups influence regulation, with small supplier groups
being more effective than consumers (a large but fragmented group). See Viscusi et al. (2005,
Chapter 10).
3See Office of Fair Trading (2003). The consumer organizationWhich? – one of the first super-
complainants – played a part in shaping tariff regulation in the UK energy sector in 2014. The
changed role of consumers can relate to utility market deregulation, increased market complexity
(e.g., banking and financial services), and growing evidence on demand-side biases.
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In our model, private agents have all relevant information. So,
uncertainty is entirely on the part of the regulator, who is aware of this
disadvantage.4 This information structure also covers the possibility that
the price ceiling is a long-term regulatory decision, while short-run market
conditions can change. We focus on a frictionless homogeneous product
market where trade occurs at a uniform price. If the price ceiling binds,
then this lowers the cost of purchase to consumers, but it results in a
shortage. For tractability, we assume quadratic cost and benefit functions,
but we argue that the qualitative results are more general.
A preliminary analysis of perfect competition with efficient rationing
shows that with no uncertainty the ceiling that maximizes consumer surplus
always binds (i.e., it is strictly lower than the equilibrium price). Consider
a price ceiling that is marginally below the market clearing price: this has
both a negative effect on consumer surplus, as some consumers are excluded
from the market, and a positive effect, as those who still purchase pay a
lower price. As the marginal consumers excluded from the market have the
lowest valuations, the negative effect is small and completely offset by the
surplus gains of all those who still purchase. The optimal ceiling balances
the gains and losses. We further show that this result is robust for relatively
low levels of demand uncertainty.
Next, we introduce arbitrary levels of uncertainty, and we characterize
the optimal price ceiling.5 We show that sufficient regulatory uncertainty
calls for a price ceiling set at a relatively high level, and thus for softer
intervention, compared with the no-uncertainty case. At this level, the
ceiling might not bind ex post, and so it might not benefit consumers.
However, it offers protection against potentially high free-market prices. To
see the intuition, suppose the optimal price ceiling under no uncertainty
were set. If the realized demand is low enough, then the market clearing
price will be lower than this ceiling and the intervention will not bind.
Then, a marginal increase in the price ceiling would not affect consumer
surplus. In contrast, if the realized demand is large enough, this ceiling
binds and a marginal increase brings it closer to the (higher) level that
is optimal for that particular high demand, and thus increasing consumer
surplus.
Our perfect competition model is relevant for interventions in
fragmented markets, such as rent controls or price caps on basic
4For example, a regulator might be uncertain of the demand for new products.
5Although, in the main text, we focus on regulatory uncertainty regarding demand, in the Online
Appendix we show that we obtain qualitatively similar results in a model with supply uncertainty
only (e.g., the regulator might be uncertain about what innovations are in the pipeline). In the
OnlineAppendix, we also outline the corresponding model with two-sided (demand and supply)
uncertainty, and we explore its solution numerically.
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consumption goods. To analyze optimal ceilings in concentrated markets
(e.g., telecommunications or utility markets), we employ an imperfectly
competitive framework, which can be interpreted as the reduced form of a
model where identical firms compete in linear supply functions. We draw on
the fact that, in this setting, aggregate supply in equilibrium is a fraction of
the perfectly competitive supply, which allows us to explore varying degrees
of market power. The reduced-form model can also represent a monopoly,
so our results apply to this limiting case.
If there is no regulatory uncertainty, then the optimal ceiling
is the same for any degree of competition. As this ceiling lies
below the perfectly competitive equilibrium price, it is also below the
(higher) imperfect competition equilibrium prices. However, with sufficient
regulatory uncertainty, we show that the appropriate level of the ceiling
depends on the degree of competition, as this determines the unregulated
market price. The more concentrated the market, the greater the expected
consumer-surplus loss if there is no regulation. This creates a stronger
incentive to lower the price ceiling, triggering a positive relationship
between the optimal ceiling and the degree of competition. Thus, with
enough uncertainty, a higher price ceiling (i.e., less restrictive intervention)
is justified in an environment with greater competitive pressure.
We also explore the impact of rationing inefficiency on the optimal
price ceiling under perfect competition.6 We determine a cut-off level of
rationing efficiency below which a price ceiling should not be used, and
we show that our previous findings are qualitatively robust when rationing
efficiency exceeds this level. Rationing is fully efficient when the goods
supplied are allocated to the consumers with the highest valuations amongst
those willing to purchase. At a binding ceiling, all consumers who buy the
product enjoy a higher surplus than in the absence of regulation. However,
with inefficient rationing, some of these consumers displace others who
value the product more. If rationing is sufficiently inefficient, then the loss
in consumer surplus from such misallocations, together with lower supply,
fully offsets the benefits for the consumers (who buy) at the lower price.
A vast body of economics literature has analyzed the rationales, design,
and impact of price regulation (see Armstrong and Sappington, 2007, for a
comprehensive review). In this context, our information structure was first
formalized by Weitzman (1974) in order to analyze the choice of regulatory
instrument. It was subsequently used in studies of optimal regulation (e.g.,
Baron and Myerson, 1982; Lewis and Sappington, 1988) that consider more
sophisticated mechanisms. Lewis and Sappington (1988) show that, in a
monopoly market, a regulator facing demand uncertainty could implement
6In our setting, the regulator cannot affect the extent of rationing efficiency in the market.
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the first-best solution by using a menu of price-transfer pairs, when marginal
cost is increasing. In contrast to these studies, we focus on a price ceiling,
a simple but commonly used instrument, which is particularly relevant in
markets where the intervention is fixed over a period in which demand can
fluctuate.7
Recent work has examined the regulation of price caps in oligopoly
markets with homogeneous products, where both the firms and the regulator
face demand uncertainty. Earle et al. (2007) point out that an increase in
a price ceiling near marginal cost might raise welfare. Grimm and Zo¨ttl
(2010) show that there is always a range of ceilings that increase production
and welfare from the unregulated market levels and, for non-degenerate
uncertainty, this range is strictly above marginal cost.8 In contrast to their
analyses, our analysis focuses on a consumer-surplus standard with only
the regulator facing uncertainty.
Consumer welfare has sometimes been used in regulation in conjunction
with a welfare standard (e.g., for merger policy in Europe and the US).
The consumer-surplus standard has been regarded as a way to redress
the regulatory and policy-making balance in favor of consumers, a less-
represented group. Besanko and Spulber (1993) show that this standard
can offset some of the informational advantage that firms have over the
regulator.9 Nevertheless, to be sure, a consumer-surplus standard has various
caveats, including adverse dynamic consequences on the innovation and
investment incentives of firms and their long-run survival.10
Our work is also related to an emerging body of literature that
explores inefficient rationing under price regulation. Bulow and Klemperer
(2012) examine the impact of price regulation on consumers in a model
with general demand and supply and random rationing, but with no
uncertainty. They show that if supply is locally more elastic than demand,
then a price ceiling always hurts consumers when demand is convex.
By considering arbitrary levels of rationing inefficiency and regulatory
uncertainty, our findings complement their findings. Glaeser and Luttmer
7Furthermore, some of the instruments required for optimal regulation (e.g., transfers) might
not be available in practice. See Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for discussion of practical
regulatory policies, and see Crew and Kleindorfer (2002) for more on the limitations of optimal
regulation models.
8In related models, Reynolds and Rietzke (2018) consider endogenous entry and identify
conditions under which a price cap is welfare improving, while Lemus and Moreno (2017)
explore the optimal ceiling when a monopolist pre-commits to a capacity level before the demand
is realized.
9Neven and Ro¨ller (2005) analyze how institutional settings, such as transparency and
accountability, interact with the choice of an appropriate standard.
10Moreover, to the extent to which consumers own the firms (e.g., through pension funds), this
standard might also be detrimental to consumers (see Motta, 2004).
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(2003) and Davis and Kilian (2011) analyze price regulation empirically,
and the welfare loss associated with inefficient rationing in competitive
markets.11 We contribute to this literature by exploring the interplay
between rationing inefficiency and regulatory uncertainty. By parametrizing
rationing efficiency, we propose a flexible theoretical framework that allows
for a range of outcomes and extends previous work.
We explore how market characteristics affect a pro-consumer price
ceiling in a static framework. However, the introduction of a price ceiling
is likely to have long-term consequences, most notably by affecting the
investment incentives of firms. Dobbs (2004) finds that under uncertainty
regarding technological change, a price cap reduces a monopolist’s incentive
to invest in capacity expansion. Also, Biglaiser and Riordan (2000) show
that dynamic adjustments of the price ceiling can distort incentives for
capital replacement. Nonetheless, as argued by Joskow (2014), a price
ceiling gives a strong incentive for cost reduction, although consumers could
only benefit later, when the ceiling is revised.12 A fuller analysis of pro-
consumer price ceilings would need to investigate the dynamic effects of
both the instrument and the consumer-surplus standard, and to assess the
relative performance of different regulatory interventions in this context.
After formulating the model in Section II, we present a preliminary
analysis of perfect competition with little or no regulatory uncertainty
in Section III. In Section IV, we introduce arbitrary levels of demand
uncertainty, and in Section V we analyze the imperfect competition case.
In Section VI, we explore the implications of rationing inefficiency. We
present our conclusions in Section VII. All proofs missing from the text
are relegated to the Appendix or the Online Appendix.
II. The Model
Consider a market in which the regulator might be uncertain about the
demand for a homogeneous product. There is no uncertainty on the part
of private agents. On this basis, the regulator chooses a price ceiling
that maximizes expected consumer surplus. The regulatory intervention is
announced to all private agents (producers and consumers).
First, we consider a perfectly competitive market. Let consumers’ gross
benefit (or utility) from the consumption of q units of the product be given
11Focusing on misallocations due to rent control, Glaeser and Luttmer show that under
conservative assumptions, 20 percent of rented apartments in NewYork City were in the wrong
hands. Davis and Kilian (2011) find substantial allocative costs in the US residential market for
natural gas over the 1950–2000 period.
12Price ceilings also have dynamic effects in the presence of search frictions. For related work,
see Armstrong et al. (2009), Fershtman and Fishman (1994), and Rauh (2004).
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by B(q, η) = (B + η)q − bq2/2, where b > 0 and B + η > 0. From the
regulator’s point of view, η is a random variable with zero mean, E(η) = 0,
distributed according to a twice continuous and differentiable cumulative
distribution function F (η) defined on a closed interval [nmin, nmax]. We
assume that the hazard rate F ′(η)/[1 − F (η)] is strictly increasing. The
suppliers’ cost of producing q units is given by C(q) = Cq + cq2/2,
where c > 0 and C > 0. Then, inverse demand and supply are Pd(q, η) =
∂B(q, η)/∂q = B + η − bq and Ps(q) = ∂C(q)/∂q = C + cq, respectively.
Writing p for unit price, it follows that direct demand and supply are
given, respectively, by
qd(p) =
B + η − p
b and q
s(p) =
p − C
c
. (1)
We assume that consumers and producers can observe η, while the
regulator cannot. This captures the informational advantage that producers
might have over the regulator, regarding demand.13
We use p∗ to denote the ex post market clearing price (where qd(p∗) =
qs(p∗)), and q∗ to denote the corresponding output level. Then,
p∗ =
c(B + η) + bC
b + c and q
∗ =
B + η − C
b + c . (2)
We assume that B + η > C for any η. This guarantees a well-defined
equilibrium output ex post. Note that ex ante (before the demand shock η
is realized), the regulator views p∗(η) as a random variable with expected
value
p∗e =
cB + bC
b + c . (3)
We explore the regulatory intervention that takes the form of a price
ceiling p¯, assuming that resale of rationed goods is not possible. A price
ceiling stipulates a maximal trade price and only binds if the unregulated
market price lies above the regulated level. If it lies at or below the ceiling,
then the outcome coincides with the unregulated market equilibrium; that
is, for a given price ceiling p¯, if p∗ ≤ p¯, then q(p) = q∗ (as given
by equation (2)), and if p∗ > p¯, then q(p) = qs(p¯) (as given by
equation (1)). The cumulative distribution function of p∗(η) is determined
by the cumulative distribution function of η (F (η)). Because η is defined
on a closed interval, so is the cumulative distribution function of p∗(η).
Then, we examine price ceilings in a model of imperfect competition,
maintaining our assumptions regarding the demand side of the market and
13Note that η might be unknown when the regulator sets a price ceiling, but it might be revealed
before the producers make supply decisions, or producers might be able to adjust their behavior
as information about η is revealed by the market.
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the quadratic cost presented above. We assume that there are N identical
suppliers and each firm i’s cost of producing qi units is given by C(q) =
Cqi+Ncq2i /2.
14 We interpret our model as one where the firms compete by
choosing linear supply functions. Building on Klemperer and Meyer (1989),
we assume that each firm chooses a supply function Si(p−C) = di(p −C),
where the slope di > 0.15 In the linear supply function equilibrium, a firm’s
supply is only a fraction of its supply in the perfect competition model (i.e.,
where the firms are price takers).16 Thus, with imperfect competition, the
firms restrict their output compared with that in the perfectly competitive
market. It then follows that the aggregate quantity supplied in the symmetric
supply function equilibrium at price p can be written as
qs(p, δ) = δ
p − C
c
,
where δ < 1 captures the restriction in output below the competitive level.
Note that δ increases with the degree of competition, captured by the
number of firms, N . As the market becomes nearly competitive (N → ∞),
δ converges to 1. Alternatively, qs(p, δ) can be regarded as an ad hoc way
of capturing the restriction in aggregate supply in a market where the firms
have market power.
Using qs(p, δ), we can derive the equilibrium outcome in the unregulated
imperfectly competitive market. We use pδ to denote the ex post unregulated
market price – where qd(pδ) = qs(pδ, δ) – and qδ to denote the
corresponding output level. Then,
pδ =
c(B + η) + δbC
δb + c and q
δ =
δ (B + η − C)
δb + c .
As in the competitive framework, the regulator views the unregulated market
price pδ(η) with imperfect competition as a random variable.
In general, price ceiling regulation can result in excess demand, in
which case the scarce output will be rationed. However, if there is some
degree of rationing inefficiency, this will limit the scope for pro-consumer
price regulation. Therefore, we adapt our perfect competition model by
introducing a parameter that captures rationing inefficiency. Specifically,
14This individual cost function guarantees that when the total cost of producing q using N -
plants in the industry is minimized, the total cost is the same as under perfect competition,
C(q) = Cq + cq2/2. Then, the marginal cost curve coincides with Ps (q).
15Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show that with unbounded demand uncertainty and a symmetric
industry, there is a unique equilibrium where firms choose linear supply functions of the form we
consider. This result holds for any distribution of uncertainty (even if it degenerates into a mass
point), so long as the support is unbounded.
16Akgu¨n (2004) employs a related framework. We present a supply function competition
microfoundation for our model in the Online Appendix.
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we write the regulator’s objective function as a linear combination of
the expected consumer surplus for both efficient rationing and extremely
inefficient rationing. With efficient rationing, the goods supplied are
allocated to the consumers with the highest valuations among those willing
to buy. With extremely inefficient rationing, the available supply is allocated
to the consumers whose valuations are the lowest. Our objective function
puts weight α on expected consumer surplus with efficient rationing, and
1 − α on expected consumer surplus with inefficient rationing, where
α ∈ [0, 1]. This covers fully efficient rationing (α = 1), extremely inefficient
rationing (α = 0), and all intermediate cases, including random rationing
that corresponds to α = 1/2.
In our model, the extent of rationing inefficiency is determined by
market conditions and is independent of regulatory uncertainty.17 For
expositional simplicity, our initial analysis assumes efficient rationing. We
then allow for arbitrary levels of rationing efficiency, and we show that the
optimal ceiling that is obtained under efficient rationing carries over for α
above a critical level, which depends on the slopes of demand and supply.
This critical level can lie above or below α = 1/2.18
III. PreliminaryAnalysis
In this section, we introduce some of our results in a “textbook” framework
of perfect competition and efficient rationing (i.e., we assume that δ = 1
and α = 1). We start with a situation where demand (as well as supply) is
deterministic, and we show that consumer surplus can be increased from
the free-market benchmark by setting an appropriate binding price ceiling.
We then discuss why this result still holds when there is a limited amount of
demand uncertainty. In the following section, we provide a formal analysis,
allowing for arbitrary degrees of uncertainty.19
Using the model introduced in Section II, let us initially assume that
η = 0. Demand becomes qd(p) = (B − p)/b, and the equilibrium price in
the unregulated market is p∗ = (cB+ bC)/(b+ c). For any price ceiling p¯ ≥
p∗, the market price is p∗ and consumer surplus is given by CS(qd(p∗)) =
b(B − C)2/2(b + c)2.
17Note that α can instead be interpreted also as the probability, for the regulator, that rationing
will be efficient, if this is independent of demand uncertainty.
18Random rationing could be used as an alternative benchmark, but then we would have to cover
two cases (with the critical level of efficiency above or below 1/2), which would complicate the
exposition.
19Under perfect competition, a price ceiling cannot improve (expected) total surplus. However,
our analysis focuses on intervention that aims to maximize consumer surplus.
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However, any price ceiling p¯ < p∗ is binding so that output is
min[qd(p¯), qs(p¯)] = qs(p¯) = (p¯ − C)/c. With efficient rationing, consumer
surplus is
CS(qs(p¯)) = Bqs(p¯) − 1
2
b(qs(p¯))2 − p¯qs(p¯)
=
(p¯ − C)[2c(B − p¯) − b(p¯ − C)]
2c2
≡ CSLd . (4)
Using CS(qd(p∗)) and CSL
d
, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. With no uncertainty, the price ceiling pˆ that maximizes consumer
surplus under perfect competition with efficient rationing is given by
pˆ =
cB + (b + c)C
b + 2c < p
∗. (5)
If a price ceiling were set marginally below the market clearing price
p∗, there would be not only a first-order gain in consumer surplus, because
the lower price would be paid by all consumers who still buy the good, but
also a second-order loss of consumer surplus from the marginal reduction
in quantity supplied. With further marginal reductions in the price ceiling,
the gain is made over steadily smaller quantities supplied, while the loss
is steadily greater because consumers with higher marginal willingness to
pay are excluded. Thus, the optimal pro-consumer price ceiling pˆ is strictly
lower than the free-market equilibrium price p∗, and this balances the trade-
off. The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates this trade-off at the optimal price
ceiling pˆ. The consumer-surplus gain is captured by the dotted rectangle,
and the loss by the dotted triangle.20
Before introducing uncertainty, we briefly discuss how the analysis
above would be affected by nonlinearity of demand and supply. It can
be seen that, for a given demand–supply intersection and for given slopes
of demand and supply at this intersection, the same qualitative conclusion
holds if there is strict convexity or strict concavity of either curve. However,
strict convexity results in a higher optimal ceiling, while strict concavity
results in a lower optimal ceiling than in the linear case. Consider the
strictly convex demand tangent to the straight line Pd(q) in the left
panel of Figure 1 at the intersection with Ps(q). The consumer-surplus
loss from the ceiling pˆ is then larger than in the figure, but the gain
is the same. Still, there are binding ceilings for which the net gain is
positive (e.g., a ceiling marginally below p∗). A similar argument holds
20Equation (1) can be written as pˆ[1 − (b − c)/cεs (pˆ)] = MR(pˆ), where εs (pˆ) is supply
elasticity and MR(pˆ) is the market marginal revenue at price p = pˆ. This gives a parallel with
the Lerner index, but with an additional relative slope term.
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Fig. 1. Optimal pro-consumer price ceiling with efficient rationing
if supply is strictly convex. Then the loss is the same and the gain is
smaller than in the linear case. These conclusions are reversed for strict
concavity.
We now introduce a small amount of demand uncertainty. The right
panel of Figure 1 illustrates the highest and lowest demand functions,
Pd(q, nmax) and Pd(q, nmin), respectively. In this case, Pd(q) is the expected
demand, and it captures a situation where the realized value of η is equal to
the expectation of η, E(η) = 0. For any realization of η, consumer surplus
is maximized at a price ceiling
pˆ(η) =
c(B + η) + (b + c)C
b + 2c < p
∗(η). (6)
This follows immediately from replacing B with B + η in Lemma 1. The
expected optimal ceiling is the same as the one in the lemma as E(pˆ(η)) =
pˆ. This is because the objective function only depends on the expectation of
η, E(η) = 0. This simple reasoning is correct so long as pˆ < p∗(nmin), which
is the case if there is only relatively little uncertainty. Therefore, our result
from the no-uncertainty case carries over to a model with relatively little
uncertainty, and the price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus
binds regardless of the realization of demand.21 In contrast, if pˆ > p∗(nmin),
the analysis will be different: such a ceiling can bind for some realizations
21This analysis relates to the case in which the regulator faces a small amount of uncertainty over
the demand intercept, though the slope is known. If, instead, the regulator knows the intercept or
the market equilibrium point, for instance, but faces a small amount of uncertainty over the slope,
the price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus is below the equilibrium price, as in
our framework.
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of demand but not for others. That is, ex post, the market clearing price
can be above or below the price ceiling.
IV. Perfect Competition
In this section, we fully investigate the impact of arbitrary levels of demand
uncertainty, focusing on price regulation where the ceiling satisfies p¯ > C,
so that supply is positive.
For a given price ceiling p¯, we define n∗(p¯), the specific value of η for
which the market clears, that is, p¯ = p∗(η). Using equation (2), we obtain
n∗(p¯) =
(b + c)(p¯ − p∗e)
c
, (7)
where p∗e, the expectation of p∗(η), is defined in equation (3). Using
equation (7), we identify three price regions where the intervention has
different implications. We then examine each of these regions as a potential
location for the optimal value of p¯.
(a) The price ceiling always binds: p¯ < p∗(nmin) (i.e., p¯ is such that
n∗(p¯) < nmin) so a price ceiling binds regardless of η, and this results
in excess demand.
(b) The price ceiling never binds: p¯ > p∗(nmax) (i.e., p¯ is such that n∗(p¯) >
nmax) so a price ceiling does not bind regardless of η, and the free-
market outcome prevails.
(c) The price ceiling might or might not bind: p¯ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)]
(i.e., p¯ is such that n∗(p¯) ∈ [nmin, nmax]), so the effect of a price
ceiling depends on the value of η. In particular, for low demand
(when η ∈ [nmin, n∗(p¯))) the price ceiling does not bind, whereas for
high demand (when η ∈ [n∗(p¯), nmax]) it results in excess demand.
Region (a). In the first case, as supply is a binding constraint regardless
of η, output is min[qd(p¯), qs(p¯)] = qs(p¯) = (p¯ − C)/c. Consumer surplus
is CS(qs(p¯), η) = (p¯ − C)[2c(B + η − p¯) − b(p¯ − C)]/2c2, and expected
consumer surplus is E(CS(qs(p¯), η)) = CSL
d
, as given in equation (4). The
price ceiling that solves the first-order condition of the optimization problem
in this region is pˆ in equation (5).
Note that pˆ is also the optimal ceiling with little or no demand
uncertainty, as we have shown in Section III. The limit on uncertainty
for which this result holds can be specified in terms of nmin (< 0). If nmin
is close enough to zero (i.e., uncertainty is small), then the price ceiling pˆ
will bind for all realizations of η, but for nmin further from zero it might
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or might not bind, depending on η. Using equations (2) and (5), let n0 be
the value of η at which pˆ is equal to the market-clearing price.
Definition 1. Let n0 = −[c(B − C)/(b + 2c)].
If there is little uncertainty (i.e., if nmin > n0), as d2CSLd /dp¯
2 < 0,
then equation (5) is a well-defined local maximum within the region
[C, p∗(nmin)]. However, with greater uncertainty (i.e., if nmin ≤ n0), CSLd is
increasing for all p¯ < p∗(nmin) and the critical value pˆ is weakly larger than
p∗(nmin), which is inconsistent with the region [C, p∗(nmin)]. This proves the
following result.
Lemma 2. With small enough demand uncertainty (i.e., nmin > n0), in the
regionwhere p¯ < p∗(nmin), the price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer
surplus under perfect competition is given by equation (5). However, if nmin ≤
n0, then an optimal price ceiling cannot be strictly lower than p∗(nmin).
After analyzing the other possible regions for the price ceiling, we
explore under what conditions the price ceiling in equation (5) is globally
optimal.
Region (b). For the second case (i.e., the price ceiling never binds), with a
price ceiling in the region p¯ > p∗(nmax), regardless of the realization of η,
the outcome is the same as with no intervention. For a given η, consumer
surplus is b(B+ η −C)2/2(b+ c)2. So, expected consumer surplus becomes
b[(B − C)2 + E(η2)]
2(b + c)2
≡ CSHd , (8)
and it is the same as in the free-market equilibrium.
Region (c). For the third case (i.e., the price ceiling might or might not
bind), p¯ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)], so n∗(p¯) ∈ [nmin, nmax]. In the following, we
summarize the main steps of the analysis, but we relegate the derivation of
the expected consumer surplus to the Appendix.
For any price ceiling p¯ ≥ p∗(η) (or, equivalently, η ≤ n∗(p¯)), the
intervention does not bind, and so the market-clearing price p∗(η) prevails
and the quantity traded is qd(p∗, η) = qs(p∗). Because qd(p∗, η) = (B + η −
p∗)/b = (B+ η −C)/(b+ c) ≡ q∗
d
, consumer surplus in this case is given by
CS(q∗
d
) = b(B + η − C)2/2(b + c)2. We use CS(q∗
d
) to derive the expected
consumer surplus conditional on p¯ ≥ p∗(η). For p¯ ≤ p∗(η) (or, equivalently,
η ≥ n∗(p¯)), the intervention leads to excess demand. The realized consumer
surplus from the qs(p¯) = (p¯ − C)/c units produced is the same as in the
first case, where the price ceiling always binds.
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In the Appendix, we derive the expressions for expected consumer
surplus in these two cases. Then, we obtain the total expected consumer
surplus in region (c), which we denote by CSd. An interior optimum solves
dCSd/dp¯ = 0, where
dCSd
dp¯ = −[1− F (n
∗(p¯))]
(b + 2c)(p¯ − C) − c(B − C)
c2
− F (n∗(p¯))
1
c
L
d
(n∗(p¯))
F (n∗(p¯))
,
(9)
with L
d
(n∗(p¯)) =
∫ n∗(p¯)
nmin
ηdF (η).
The two terms in equation (9) are related to the fact that a price ceiling
p¯ might or might not bind, and they are weighted by their respective
probabilities. The fraction −[(b + 2c)(p¯ − C) − c(B − C)]/c2 is the value of
dCSd/dp¯ when there is no uncertainty and supply is the binding constraint,
as in our preliminary analysis. The second term in equation (9) shows the
impact of demand uncertainty. Note that L
d
(n∗(p¯))/F (n∗(p¯)) (< 0) is the
expected value of η, conditional on the ceiling not binding, and a more
negative value represents greater demand uncertainty.
The next result combines the analyses of the three regions, and uses
equations (4), (8), and (A4).
Lemma 3. With demand uncertainty, expected consumer surplus under
perfect competition is (a) continuous and differentiable for all values of p¯ > C,
and (b) independent of p¯ at any price ceiling p¯ ≥ p∗(nmax) because the
intervention is not binding in this range.
In the Appendix, using Lemma 3, and as the hazard rate of η is strictly
increasing, we show that the objective function is single-peaked over the
three regions and the location of the optimal ceiling depends on the degree
of uncertainty. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 1. Under perfect competition, if demand uncertainty is small (i.e.,
nmin > n0), then the unique price ceiling that globally maximizes expected
consumer surplus always binds and is given by equation (5). However, if
demand uncertainty is large (i.e., if nmin ≤ n0), then it lies in the interval
[p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)) and might or might not bind, ex post.
This proposition highlights the effects of the degree of uncertainty on
optimal pro-consumer regulation. The solution for nmin > n0 is related to
the effects discussed in Section III. It generalizes the result that, under no
uncertainty, a price ceiling p¯ = pˆ below the market equilibrium maximizes
consumer surplus. When demand is stochastic, it is not known ex ante
whether supply will be a binding constraint on consumption. However,
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with small uncertainty, CSd is maximized with the same price ceiling,
p¯ = pˆ. Moreover, the analysis preceding Proposition 1 shows that an optimal
ceiling cannot lie in [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)]. Instead, it is strictly lower than
p∗(nmin) and, implicitly, lower than the expected market-clearing price p∗e.
Nevertheless, if the regulator faces enough uncertainty (nmin ≤ n0), this
favors setting a price ceiling that is relatively high and, therefore, less likely
to bind.
Intuitively, taking the no-uncertainty case, at the optimal ceiling pˆ,
supply is a binding constraint and so q = qs(pˆ). If we allow for small
uncertainty (i.e., nmin > n0), then at price ceiling pˆ, supply remains a
binding constraint, q = qs(pˆ) for any η, and pˆ remains the optimal ceiling.
If, instead, uncertainty is large (i.e., nmin ≤ n0) and the regulator still
sets p¯ = pˆ, this ceiling would not bind for very low demand realizations
(as the equilibrium price is below pˆ), but it would still bind for high
demand realizations. Suppose the regulator marginally increases the ceiling
to p¯ = pˆ + ε for small ε > 0. For very low demand realizations, p¯ = pˆ + ε
would still not bind and ex post output (and consumer surplus) would be the
same as at p¯ = pˆ. For high demand realizations, both p¯ = pˆ and p¯ = pˆ + ε
would bind. However, p¯ = pˆ + ε would result in higher consumer surplus
because p¯ = pˆ is the optimal ceiling when η = 0, and it is lower than the
optimal ceiling that would apply for any high demand realization (where
η > 0). Hence, with great enough uncertainty, expected consumer surplus
is larger at p¯ = pˆ + ε than at p¯ = pˆ, and so the optimal price ceiling is
higher than when there is no or little uncertainty.22
We now compare the optimal ceiling first to the expected market-
clearing price and then to the optimal ceiling under no uncertainty.
Corollary 1. With demand uncertainty and perfect competition, if nmin > n0,
the optimal ceiling lies below the expected market-clearing price p∗e. However,
if nmin ≤ n0, the optimal ceiling might be greater or smaller than p∗e, as CSd
is maximized at p¯  p∗e when −[1 − F(0)]c(B − C) − (b + c)Ld (0)  0.
Thus, with large enough uncertainty the optimal pro-consumer price
ceiling can exceed p∗e. The following example illustrates this.
Example 1. Let η ∼ U[−n, n]. Then, L
d
(0) = −n/4, F (0) = 1/2, and nmin ≤
n0 ⇔ n ≥ c(B − C)/(b + 2c). Here, CSd is maximized at p¯  p∗e as n 
2c(B − C)/(b + c). So, for n ∈ [c(B − C)/(b + 2c), 2c(B − C)/(b + c)] (for
n > 2c(B − C)/(b + c)), the optimal ceiling is lower (higher) than p∗e.
Although this section focuses on the role of regulatory uncertainty, the
setting with no uncertainty in Section III is a special case where η has a
22This intuition also applies when the regulator knows the demand intercept but faces uncertainty
over the slope, which suggests that our results carry over unchanged to such an environment.
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degenerate distribution so that nmin = nmax = 0. With greater uncertainty
(for nmin ≤ n0), a price ceiling in the middle region, p¯ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)],
is optimal. In this case, the no-uncertainty optimal ceiling pˆ also belongs
to the middle region. Evaluating equation (9) at pˆ, we obtain
dCSd(p¯)
dp¯

p¯=pˆ
= −
1
c
Ld (n
∗(pˆ)) ≥ 0,
where the weak inequality follows from L
d
(n∗(pˆ)) ≤ 0, and holds with
equality only for nmin = n0 (or, p∗(nmin) = pˆ).
Corollary 2. With large enough uncertainty (nmin ≤ n0), the optimal price
ceiling is strictly higher than pˆ, the optimal ceiling with smaller or no
uncertainty.
Thus, larger regulatory uncertainty calls for softer intervention, with the
price ceiling set at a relatively high level compared to a case where there
is no uncertainty.
V. Imperfect Competition
We now analyze the price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer
surplus in the imperfectly competitive model presented in Section II. This
framework, where suppliers have (some) market power, allows us to study
the impact of the degree of competition on the optimal pro-consumer
ceiling, and it can be interpreted as the reduced form of a model where
firms compete in supply functions. However, we show that our analysis is
also applicable in the limiting case of a monopoly market. Here, δ < 1
measures competitive pressure, and a larger value corresponds to more
intense competition.
With no uncertainty, the optimal pro-consumer price ceiling from
Section III is still obtained with imperfect competition as consumer surplus
is maximized at the same price level. Recall that aggregate marginal cost
is the same under perfect and imperfect competition (see the discussion
in Section II and footnote 14). A binding price ceiling becomes marginal
revenue for all firms, and the total quantity is given by equating this ceiling
with aggregate marginal cost, as in the perfectly competitive case. However,
as we show below, this is no longer true with large enough uncertainty.
Consider a realization of demand η. Then, the equilibrium price in the
imperfectly competitive market is given by
pδ(η, δ) =
c(B + η) + δbC
δb + c > p
∗(η),
where p∗(η) is the perfectly competitive price (see Figure 2).
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Fig. 2. Imperfectly competitive price
A price ceiling p¯ binds or not depending on its position relative to
pδ(η, δ). If p¯ ≥ pδ(η, δ), then the intervention does not bind and the
imperfectly competitive market outcome prevails. If p¯ < pδ(η, δ), then
the intervention binds and either demand or supply can be a constraint
depending on the position of p¯ relative to the perfectly competitive price
p∗(η). More specifically, if p¯ < p∗(η), the quantity traded will be qs(p¯) and
there is excess demand. If p∗(η) < p¯ < pδ(η), then the quantity traded will
be qd(p¯) and there is excess supply.
Consider our supply function competition interpretation. If the market
is unregulated, the firms compete by choosing price-quantity schedules.
However, in the presence of a binding price ceiling, the firms can no longer
adjust the price, so they can only choose optimally the output levels.23
When the intervention binds, p¯ becomes the (constant) marginal revenue.
Therefore, the firms will supply the quantity at which p¯ equals marginal
cost Ps(q) unless demand is a binding constraint, in which case they supply
the quantity demanded at p¯. So, the quantity traded in the market at the
regulated price is min{qd(p¯), qs(p¯)}, where qs(p¯) is the quantity at which
marginal cost equals p¯.24 This is different from the perfectly competitive
model where a binding ceiling could only result in excess demand.
As before, we examine different price regions as potential locations for
the optimal price ceiling. The same three regions from Section IV apply,
23In this sense, in a market where, without intervention, firms compete in supply functions, the
introduction of a binding price ceiling leads to a change in competition as the firms become
price-takers.
24qs (p) is the same as the perfectly competitive supply. In contrast, qs (p, δ) is the aggregate
supply in the unregulated market where the firms compete in supply functions and qs (p, δ) =
δqs (p).
C© 2018 The Authors. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Fo¨reningen
fo¨r utgivande av the SJE/The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
1774 Pro-consumer price ceilings under regulatory uncertainty
depending on the realization of η. For clarity, in this section, we will refer
to these regions as (a′), (b′), and (c′). With imperfect competition, the
potential outcomes for region (c′) are more complicated than for region (c)
in Section IV, because either demand or supply can bind. We outline the
analysis for each region here but leave the details to the Appendix. There
is a minor difference in the argument depending on whether pδ(nmin, δ)
(i.e., the ex post equilibrium price under imperfect competition for the
lowest demand realization) is greater or smaller than p∗(nmax) (i.e., the ex
post equilibrium price under perfect competition for the highest demand
realization).25 We proceed on the assumption that pδ(nmin, δ) < p∗(nmax)
and cover the reverse case in footnote 27.26
(a′) The price ceiling always binds (p¯ < p∗(nmin)). The corresponding
analysis in Section IV carries over unchanged. So, if pδ(nmin, δ) <
p∗(nmax) and nmin > n0, the optimal pro-consumer price ceiling in this
region is given by equation (5). However, if nmin ≤ n0, an optimal
ceiling cannot be strictly lower than p∗(nmin) as expected consumer
surplus is increasing in p¯.
(b′) The price ceiling never binds (p¯ > p∗(nmax)). For values of η at which
the ceiling binds, demand is a constraint, that is min{qd(p¯), qs(p¯)} =
qd(p¯). Hence, a small decrease in p¯ leads to an increase in consumer
surplus. At values of η where the ceiling does not bind, a decrease
in the ceiling either has no effect on consumer surplus or, if it has, it
boosts consumer surplus as the unregulated market price is above the
competitive level for δ < 1. In effect, an optimal price ceiling cannot
belong to this region.
(c′) The price ceiling might or might not bind (p¯ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)]).
We identify two subregions as potential locations for the optimal price
ceiling, [p∗(nmin), pδ(nmin, δ)] and (pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)]. We sketch
the arguments below and relegate the details to the Appendix.
(c′1) Consider, first, p¯ ∈ [p∗(nmin), pδ(nmin, δ)]. As the upper bound
pδ(nmin, δ) is the lowest possible unregulated market price, the
ceiling binds regardless of η. However, depending on η, the
25The sign of pδ (nmin, δ) − p∗(nmax) depends on all the parameters in the model. However, at
least for a symmetric distribution where η ∈ [−n, n], there is a cut-off level of uncertainty at
n = b(1 − δ)(B −C)/b(1 + δ) + 2c ≡ nˆ. For n > (<)nˆ, pδ (nmin, δ) − p∗(nmax) < (>)0.
26Even if, for some values of δ, pδ (nmin, δ) ≥ p∗(nmax), there exists a cut-off value δ0, so
that for δ ∈ [δ0, 1), pδ (nmin, δ) < p∗(nmax). This is because limδ→1pδ (nmin, δ) = p∗(nmin) <
p∗(nmax). When δ → 1, the market becomes almost perfectly competitive. The cut-off value δ0
is implicitly defined by p∗(nmax) = pδ (nmin, δ0).
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intervention can lead to excess demand or excess supply. The
derivation is the same as in the perfectly competitive case (with
the critical value η = n∗(p¯)), except that the upper bound to the
region is at a higher price ceiling.
(c′2) For p¯ ∈ (pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)], the price ceiling might or might
not bind depending on the value of η. The critical value η =
n∗(p¯) again applies, and for high enough demand realizations
(η > n∗(p¯)) there is excess demand, so that q = qs(p¯). However,
for lower demand realizations (η ≤ n∗(p¯)) there is only excess
supply if demand is not too low. If, for example, η = nmin, the
equilibrium unregulated price is pδ(nmin, δ), which is below this
subregion, and so the price ceiling does not bind. More generally,
for values of η below a cut-off value n∗∗(p¯, δ), the price ceiling
does not bind and the quantity traded is qd(pδ(η, δ)).27
In the Online Appendix, we show that for nmin > n0, the globally optimal
price ceiling is strictly lower than p∗(nmin) and given by equation (5),
whereas for nmin ≤ n0 it lies in the interval [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)].28 We are
now ready to state the following result.
Proposition 2. For sufficiently large demand uncertainty (nmin ≤ n0), the
optimal pro-consumer price ceiling with imperfect competition is increasing
with the degree of competition. For smaller uncertainty (nmin > n0), it is
independent of the degree of competition.
With no uncertainty, the optimal ceiling is independent of δ. However,
with sufficient uncertainty, it is increasing with the degree of competition
and, therefore, it is lower than the optimal ceiling in the perfectly
competitive market. A decrease in the optimal ceiling generates significant
gains in consumer surplus under high demand realizations. If the optimal
ceiling is lower than pδ(nmin, δ), so that it binds regardless of the realized
demand, then it is independent of the degree of competition and is weakly
lower than in the competitive case. If the optimal ceiling is higher than
pδ(nmin, δ), it might or might not bind depending on the realization of
demand, and it is smoothly increasing with the degree of competition.
With great enough uncertainty, the optimal ceiling is lower if the market
is less competitive. We use p¯c to denote the price ceiling that is optimal
under perfect competition and we suppose it is set in an imperfectly
27If pδ (nmin, δ) ≥ p∗(nmax), the analysis is qualitatively the same as we have outlined in the
text, except in one respect. By definition, subregion (c′2) does not exist. Intuitively, the analysis
in (c′1) applies now to the entire range.
28We show in the Appendix that expected consumer surplus is single peaked.
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competitive market. For those high-demand realizations for which p¯c binds
under perfect competition, it will also bind under imperfect competition,
and so the same outcome obtains regardless of the degree of competition.
In contrast, for those demand realizations for which p¯c does not bind under
perfect competition, the price obtained under imperfect competition (either
pδ(η) or p¯c , depending on the value of η) is higher than the perfectly
competitive price (i.e., the market-clearing price p∗(η)). However, for any
given demand realization η, consumer surplus is maximized at a price
pˆ(η) < p∗(η). Thus, for each possible lower demand realization, price
under perfect competition exceeds the corresponding optimal price ceiling,
and under imperfect competition is greater still. To limit such effects, the
optimal ceiling under imperfect competition is lower than that under perfect
competition, and it decreases with the degree of market power. In this sense,
our analysis shows that, with sufficient regulatory uncertainty, competitive
pressure weakens the scope for pro-consumer regulatory intervention.29
In our imperfect competition model, aggregate output is a fraction
δ of the competitive supply. This result builds on the supply function
competition microfoundation and, in the Online Appendix, we show that
δ ≥ 2c/(c +
√
c(2b + c)) for N ≥ 2. However, the reduced-form model
with an output restriction can also capture a monopoly market when
δ = c/(b + c). Therefore, the analysis in this section directly applies to
a market with a monopoly supplier.
VI. Inefficient Rationing
We now focus on the impact of rationing inefficiency on the optimal pro-
consumer price ceiling under perfect competition. We show that, if rationing
efficiency α is great enough, the qualitative results from Section IV still
hold, although the level of the optimal ceiling might depend on the value
of α. We identify a cut-off rationing efficiency below which a price ceiling
should not be set.
We use the three regions for the optimal ceiling specified in Section IV.
In region (b), as a price ceiling never binds (p¯ > p∗(nmax)), expected
consumer surplus is unaffected by rationing inefficiency and so is given by
equation (8). However, in region (c), supply might be a binding constraint
and, in region (a), it surely is. So, for these regions, inefficiency of rationing
plays an important role. For regions (a) and (c), we write the regulator’s
29We focus here on the optimal ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus in the presence
of regulatory uncertainty under imperfect competition. Our intuition is that, in this setting, the
expected welfare maximizing ceiling would be at or above the expected market-clearing price
and – as the optimal pro-consumer ceiling – is increasing with the degree of competition.
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objective function as the weighted sum of expected surplus under fully
efficient rationing (with weight α ∈ [0, 1]) and under extremely inefficient
rationing (with weight 1 − α). Below, we outline the basic reasoning
underlying the analysis of inefficient rationing, but the full derivation is
relegated to the Online Appendix.
When supply binds for a given price ceiling p¯, output qs(p¯) = (p¯ − C)/c
is bought by the consumers with the lowest valuations amongst those willing
to pay at least p¯. Then, the qs(p¯) = (p¯ − C)/c units available are purchased
by consumers along the lowest part of the demand curve at and above p¯
(i.e., from qd(p¯) − qs(p¯) to qd(p¯)). For a given realization of demand η, at
qd(p¯) − qs(p¯) consumer surplus per unit is B + η − b(qd(p¯) − qs(p¯)) − p¯,
while at qd(p¯) it is zero. So, using equation (1), total consumer surplus
is then b(p¯ − C)2/2c2 ≡ CSL
d0 (and independent of η). We use CS
L
d0 to
calculate expected consumer surplus under extremely inefficient rationing,
taking into account that in region (a) supply always binds, whereas in region
(c) it binds only for η ≥ n∗(p¯).
Below, we extend Proposition 1 for arbitrary values of α. To do so,
we define a critical level of the price ceiling and a threshold degree of
uncertainty, which generalize the value in equation (5) and Definition 1,
respectively, for arbitrary rationing efficiency α:
pˆ(α) =
αc(B + C) − (1 − 2α)bC
2α(b + c) − b (10)
n0(α) = −
[α(b + c) − b](B − C)
2α(b + c) − b . (11)
Both pˆ(α) and n0(α) are well defined for α  b/2(b + c). For α = 1, pˆ(α)
reduces to the value specified in equation (5) and n0(α) = n0.
Proposition 3. Assume perfect competition. For rationing efficiency α >
b/(b + c), there is a unique price ceiling that globally maximizes expected
consumer surplus: if nmin > n0(α), this optimal ceiling is given by
equation (11) and always binds; while if nmin ≤ n0(α), it lies in the interval
[p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)). For rationing efficiency α ≤ b/(b + c), any price ceiling
decreases expected consumer surplus.
This proposition highlights the combined effects of rationing efficiency
and the degree of uncertainty on the optimal ceiling. Provided that α >
b/(b+ c), the qualitative conclusions in Section IV carry over. If uncertainty
is relatively small (nmin > n0(α)) a price ceiling in the low region (a), which
is sure to bind, is optimal. This situation is illustrated in the right panel of
Figure 1. If uncertainty is greater (nmin ≤ n0(α)), the optimal ceiling is in
region (c) and might or might not bind. The critical uncertainty level, as
represented by n0(α), is decreasing with α. Thus, the greater the rationing
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efficiency, the greater the maximum amount of uncertainty for which the
optimal ceiling lies in the low region, and this binds for sure. The condition
α > b/(b + c) is consistent with a wide range of inefficiency; for example,
if demand is less steep than supply (b < c), it is consistent with random
rationing (α = 1/2).
For large uncertainty (nmin ≤ n0(α)) and sufficiently efficient rationing
(α > b/(b + c)), the optimal ceiling can lie above or below the expected
market-clearing price. In the Online Appendix, we present a condition that
generalizes Corollary 1, and also shows that, when rationing efficiency α
is smaller (but α > b/(b+ c)), the level of demand uncertainty required for
p¯ to exceed p∗e is greater.
When instead α ≤ b/(b + c), a price ceiling should not be set, regardless
of the amount of demand uncertainty. If rationing efficiency is this low,
price regulation has a large allocative cost that eliminates the scope for
pro-consumer intervention. If b > c, this non-intervention result holds even
for random rationing; but, if b < c, intervention can increase expected
consumer surplus even with worse than random rationing.
If uncertainty is great enough (nmin ≤ n0), then, generalizing our result
for efficient rationing, the optimal price ceiling lies in region (c) and is
strictly higher than pˆ(α), the optimal ceiling with smaller or no uncertainty.
Moreover, Proposition 3 allows us to characterize fully the relationship
between the efficiency of rationing α and the optimal price ceiling.
Corollary 3. With perfect competition, for α ≥ b/(b + c), the optimal pro-
consumer price ceiling is strictly decreasing with the rationing efficiency α.
Thus, whenever it is optimal to set a price ceiling that can bind, there
is a negative relationship between the optimal level and the efficiency of
rationing.
VII. Conclusions
We explore the impact of market conditions on optimal price ceiling
regulation in a setting where the regulator maximizes expected consumer
surplus and is imperfectly informed about demand. Under perfect
competition, regulatory uncertainty does not eliminate the rationale for price
ceiling intervention, but sufficient uncertainty calls for softer intervention,
with the ceiling set at a relatively high level. Under imperfect competition,
if there is sufficient uncertainty, the optimal ceiling increases with the
degree of competition, and so competitive pressure justifies less restrictive
regulatory intervention. This result is broadly consistent, for example, with
Oftel’s decision in 2002 to increase the price ceiling imposed on British
Telecom once new suppliers entered the telecommunications market. We
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extend the perfect competition model to allow for rationing inefficiency and
we identify a cut-off level of rationing inefficiency above which a ceiling
should not be used. Above this level, our qualitative results from the model
with efficient rationing carry over unchanged.
We focus on demand uncertainty, but our results are qualitatively robust
in settings with supply uncertainty only, or where the regulator faces
both demand and supply uncertainty, as we formally show in the Online
Appendix. For tractability, we focus on linear demand and supply, but the
intuition suggests that our results are qualitatively robust to more general
assumptions.30 Likewise, the main insights would be relevant in settings
where the regulatory standard is a weighted sum of consumer surplus and
profit.
Appendix
Preliminary Analysis
Proof of Lemma 1: (a) At p¯ ≥ p∗, dCS(qd(p∗))/dp¯ = 0. (b) When p¯ < p∗,
the first-order condition ∂CSL
d
/∂ p¯ = 0 gives equation (5). The second-order
condition is always satisfied. The optimal ceiling lies in (C, p∗), so is well
defined. 
Perfect Competition
(c) The price ceiling might or might not bind
Remark 1. Equation (7) implies that prob(p∗ ≤ p¯) = prob(η ≤ n∗(p¯)) =
F (n∗(p¯)).
Using Remark 1, expected consumer surplus conditional on p¯ ≥ p∗(η)
is given by
E[CS(q∗d) | η ≤ n
∗(p¯)] =
∫ n∗(p¯)
nmin
CS(q∗
d
)dF (η)
F (n∗(p¯))
≡ CS∗d . (A1)
Substituting for CS(q∗
d
) = b(B + η − C)2/2(b + c)2 in equation (A1), and
using L
d
(n∗(p¯)) =
∫ n∗(p¯)
nmin
ηdF (η) and ΥL
d
(n∗(p¯)) =
∫ n∗(p¯)
nmin
η2dF (η), we have
CS∗d =
b[(B − C)2F (n∗(p¯)) + 2(B − C)L
d
(n∗(p¯)) + ΥL
d
(n∗(p¯))]
2(b + c)2F (n∗(p¯))
.
30More precisely, as long as demand and supply (marginal cost) are well behaved, demand is
finite for all positive prices, and there is scope for trade ex post, then the intuitive arguments
carry over.
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The expected consumer surplus conditional on p¯ ≤ p∗(η) is
E[CS(qs(p¯), η) | η ≥ n∗(p¯)] =
∫ nmax
n∗(p¯)
CS(qs(p¯), η)dF (η)
1 − F (n∗(p¯))
≡ CSSd . (A2)
Substituting for CS(qs(p¯) in equation (A2), and letting H
d
(n∗(p¯)) =∫ nmax
n∗(p¯)
ηdF (η), we obtain
(p¯ − C)[2c(B − p¯) − b(p¯ − C)]
2c2
+
(p¯ − C)H
d
(n∗(p¯))
c(1 − F (n∗(p¯)))
≡ CSSd . (A3)
Total expected consumer surplus for any given price ceiling p¯ ∈
[p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)] is
E[CS(p¯)] = F (n∗(p¯))CS∗d + (1 − F (n
∗(p¯)))CSSd ≡ CSd . (A4)
Proof of Lemma 3: It is easy to see from equations (4), (8), and (A4) that
expected consumer surplus is piecewise continuous and differentiable. So
we focus on the continuity and differentiability of the expected consumer
surplus at p∗(nmin) and p∗(nmax).
Continuity at p∗(nmin) = [c(B + nmin) + bC]/(b + c) : lim p¯↗p∗(nmin)
CSL
d
(p¯) = CSS
d
(p∗(nmin)), where CSSd is given in equation (A3). The equality
follows as F (nmin) = Hd (nmin) = 0. Because Υ
L
d
(nmin) = 
L
d
(nmin) = 0, then
lim p¯↗p∗(nmin) CSLd (p¯) = CSd(nmin) so the result follows.
Continuity at p∗(nmax): as F (nmax) = 1, Ld (nmax) = 0 and Υ
L
d
(nmax) =
E(η2), then CSd(nmax) = CS∗d(nmax) = lim p¯↘p∗(nmax) CS
H
d
(p¯) = CSH
d
and the
result follows.
Differentiability at p∗(nmin): in region (a), lim p¯↗p∗(nmin) ∂CSLd /∂ p¯ =
[c(B − C) − (p∗(nmin) − C)(b + 2c)] /c2. In region (c), as Ld (nmin) =
F (nmin) = 0, ∂CSd(p∗(nmin))/∂ p¯ = lim p¯↗p∗(nmin) ∂CSLd /∂ p¯. The result
follows.
Differentiability at p∗(nmax): in region (c), using ∂CSd/∂ p¯ given in
equation (9), along with L
d
(nmax) = 0 and F (nmax) = 1, it follows
that ∂CSd(p∗(nmax))/∂ p¯ = 0. As equation (8) is independent of p¯,
lim p¯↘p∗(nmax) ∂CSHd /∂ p¯ = 0. The result follows.
The second part of the lemma follows, as expected consumer surplus is
continuous at p∗(nmax) and equation (8) is independent of p¯. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that nmin ≤ n0. From equation (9),
d2CSd
dp¯2
=
−(b + 2c)[1 − F (n∗(p¯))] + (b + c)(p¯ − C)F ′(n∗(p¯))
c2
.
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As L
d
(nmax) = E(η) = 0 and F (nmax) = 1, p∗(nmax) satisfies the first-
order condition in region (c). CSd is convex at this point, and so p∗(nmax)
is a local minimum. Hence, CSd is decreasing with p¯ as it approaches
p∗(nmax) from below. Also, by Lemma 3, all p¯ > p∗(nmax) give the same
level of expected consumer surplus as p¯ = p∗(nmax). Using equations (7)
and (9), CSd is increasing at p∗(nmin) iff nmin ≤ n0. Moreover, by
Lemma 2, if nmin ≤ n0, there is no candidate optimal ceiling strictly below
p∗(nmin). Hence, if nmin ≤ n0, the global optimal ceiling must belong to
[p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)) and is unique, and
sign
d2CSd
dp¯2
= sign
{
F ′(n∗(p¯))/[1 − F (n∗(p¯))] − (b + 2c)
c2(b + c)(p¯ − C)
}
,
where F ′(n∗(p¯))/[1 − F (n∗(p¯))] is, by assumption, strictly increasing on
[p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)]. As 1/(p¯ − C) is strictly decreasing with p¯, CSd has a
unique inflexion point, pdI . Because, at p
∗(nmax), d2CSd/dp¯2 > 0, so CSd
is convex for all p¯ ∈ (pdI , p
∗(nmax)). However, if p¯ < pdI , then 1/(p¯ − C)
is greater and the hazard rate is smaller, so that d2CSd/dp¯2 < 0 for all
p¯ ∈ (p∗(nmin), pdI ). Thus, when nmin ≤ n0 there is a unique globally optimal
price ceiling in [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)).
Now suppose nmin > n0. For p¯ > p∗(nmax), the ceiling does not bind and
CSd is the same as for p¯ = p∗(nmax). For p¯ < p∗(nmin), by Lemma 2 CSd
is maximized at p¯ = pˆ. Lastly, consider the region p¯ ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)].
From (7) and (9) dCSd/dp¯ < 0 at p∗(nmin) and so, from our argument
above, dCSd/dp¯ < 0 for the whole region. Hence, across the three regions
CSd is maximized at p¯ = pˆ. 
Proof ofCorollary 1: For nmin > n0, the result follows from equations (3) and
(5). For nmin ≤ n0, we evaluate dCSd/dp¯ at p¯ = p∗e as given in equation (3),
and we obtain
dCSd(p∗e)
dp¯ = −
(1 − F (0))(B − C)
b + c −
L
d
(0)
c
.
The second term is non-positive, while the first is non-negative as L
d
(0) < 0.
Depending on the sign of dCSd(p∗e)/dp¯, CSd is maximized at p¯  p∗e. 
Imperfect Competition
Analysis for region (c′). As pδ(nmin, δ) ∈ [p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)], we explore
two subregions [p∗(nmin), pδ(nmin, δ)] and (pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)].
(c′1) If p¯ ∈ [p∗(nmin), pδ(nmin, δ)], the ceiling binds regardless of η. For
a given p¯, ∃η = n∗(p¯) s.t. p∗(η) = p¯. This is the same as n∗(p¯) in
equation (7). If p¯ ≥ p∗(η) (i.e., if η ≤ n∗(p¯)), there is excess supply,
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so consumer surplus is determined by qd(p¯). If p¯ < p∗(η) (i.e., if
η > n∗(p¯)), then there is excess demand, so consumer surplus is
determined by qs(p¯), the quantity at which marginal cost equals p¯.
Let CSLδ be the expected consumer surplus in this case. Then, using
L
d
(n∗(p¯)) as defined in Section IV, dCSLδ /dp¯ is given by
−
1
b (B − p¯) −
b + c
bc 
L
d (n
∗(p¯)) +
(b + c)[c(B − C) − (b + c)(p¯ − C)]
bc2
×[1 − F (n∗(p¯))]. (A5)
(c′2) For p¯ ∈ (pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)], the ceiling might or might not bind,
depending on η. There is a cut-off η. Let this be n∗∗(p¯, δ), implicitly
defined by pδ(n∗∗, δ) = p¯, so that for η < n∗∗(p¯, δ) the ceiling does
not bind and the quantity traded is qd(pδ(η, δ)). For η ≥ n∗∗(p¯, δ), the
ceiling can lead to excess demand or excess supply depending on the
value of η. Specifically, ∃η = n∗(p¯) for which p∗(η) = p¯. This is the
same as in equation (7), and n∗∗(p¯, δ) < n∗(p¯). If n∗∗(p¯, δ) ≤ η ≤ n∗(p¯),
there is excess supply, so that consumer surplus is determined by
qd(p¯). If η > n∗(p¯), there is excess demand and consumer surplus
is determined by qs(p¯), the quantity at which marginal cost equals
p¯. Let CSHδ be the expected consumer surplus in this case. Then,
dCSHδ /dp¯ is given by
−
1
b (B − p¯)[F (n
∗(p¯)) − F (n∗∗(p¯, δ))] −
b + c
bc 
L
d (n
∗(p¯)) (A6)
+
1
b
L
d (n
∗∗(p¯, δ)) +
c(B − p¯) − (b + c)(p¯ − C)
c2
[1 − F (n∗(p¯))],
where n∗∗(p¯, δ) = [(δb + c)p − cB − δbC]/c and L
d
(n∗∗(p¯)) =∫ n∗∗(p¯)
nmin
ηdF (η).
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose nmin > −c(B − C)/(b + 2c). Then, the
globally optimal price ceiling is given by equation (5) and is independent
of δ.
Suppose nmin < −c(B − C)/(b + 2c). Let pδ(nmin, δ) < p∗(nmax). If the
globally optimal ceiling lies in [p∗(nmin), pδ(nmin, δ)), it solves dCSLδ /dp¯ =
0 (see equation (A5)). Evaluating equation (A5) at the ceiling that solves
dCSd/dp¯ = 0 (i.e., the optimal ceiling under perfect competition; see
equation (9)), we obtain
−
(B − p¯)F (n∗(p¯)) + L
d
(n∗(p¯))
b < 0.
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The inequality follows as
L
d
(n∗(p¯))
F (n∗(p¯))
= E(η | η < n∗(p¯)) ∈ [nmin, nmax].
If the globally optimal ceiling lies in [pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)), it solves
dCSHδ /dp¯ = 0 (see equation (A6)). Whenever CS
H
δ has an interior
maximum in the interval (pδ(nmin, δ), p∗(nmax)], the optimal ceiling is
increasing with δ. This follows from the local concavity of CSHδ at the
optimal ceiling and from
d(CSδH )
2
dp¯ dδ =
δb(p¯ − C)2F ′(n∗∗(p¯, δ))
c2
> 0.
If the optimal price ceiling with imperfect competition lies in this subregion,
it is strictly lower than the optimal ceiling with perfect competition.
Let pδ(nmin, δ) ≥ p∗(nmax). Then, the globally optimal ceiling lies in
[p∗(nmin), p∗(nmax)) and solves dCSLδ /dp¯ = 0. The above comparison
with the optimal ceiling under perfect competition applies, and the result
follows. 
Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article.
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